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Abstract
This dissertation is composed of three essays.
Chapter 1 studies the role of the composition of intermediate inputs in shaping the
dynamics of skill premium in developing countries following trade liberalization. The
sharp increase in the skill premium in developing countries following trade liberalization
is an empirical regularity that is at odds with the predictions of standard Heckscher-
Ohlin trade theory. In this paper, I argue that most of the rise in the skill premium is
accounted for by complementarity between high skilled labor and foreign intermediate
inputs. To quantitatively assess this effect, I build a model featuring two types of labor,
high skilled and low skilled, which interact with foreign and domestic inputs at varying
degrees of substitution. In this environment, increased access to foreign intermediate
inputs raises the relative demand for skilled labor, and consequently, the skill premium.
Using firm-level microdata from Ghana, I provide evidence for this mechanism and
estimate the degree of skill-complementarity. I find that with differences in substitution
elasticities, changes in the observed shares of foreign intermediate inputs account for
75% of the rise in the skill premium observed in the data.
Chapter 2 studies the determinants of the negative educational gradient in divorce.
The data suggests that couples with higher levels of education face a lower risk of di-
vorce. This observation is puzzling in the context of standard models of household
formation, which are based on the trade-off between gains from joint-consumption and
match quality. In these models, the gain from joint consumption is lower for college-
educated people due to decreasing returns in consumption, but the gain from match
quality is higher, leading to a higher divorce rate. To resolve this puzzling observation,
I provide evidence that divorce reduces the chances of success for children. Moreover,
this reduction is much more pronounced for children with college-educated parents than
for those with non-college educated parents. This additional cost for college-educated
iii
parents, in the form of a lower likelihood that their offspring complete their college
degree, provides a stabilization effect. I build a model of household formation to quan-
titatively assess to what extent this larger reduction can account for the divorce gap
observed in the data. I estimate that these higher costs impute to parents of higher lev-
els of education account for almost two thirds of the divorce gap. This finding suggests
that the benefit of marriage conferred on college-educated parents in rearing children is
the primary factor in shaping the differences in divorce.
Chapter 3 explores the causes behind an increasing gap between college graduates
and high school graduates in entrepreneurship entry. Up until the 1980s, both col-
lege graduates and high school graduates had the same propensity of becoming en-
trepreneurs. The fraction of these two groups who were entrepreneurs was 13%. How-
ever, after the 1980s, there was a substantial gap between the number of college and high
school entrepreneurs. In 2010, the fraction of college graduates who were entrepreneurs
increased to 20%, while the same fraction stayed at 14% for high school graduates. I
build a model of educational choice and occupational choice to unravel the underlying
economic forces in shaping this increasing gap. The findings of this paper suggest that
an increasing complementarity between managerial ability and education is the main
driver of the gap in entrepreneurship entry.
iv
Contents
Acknowledgements i
Dedication ii
Abstract iii
List of Tables iv
List of Figures vi
1 Imported Intermediate Inputs and the Skill Premium: Micro Evidence
from Ghana 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 The Case of Trade Policy Reform in Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.1 Trade Liberalization Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Facts on the Skill Premium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4.1 Key Facts on Trade and Skill Premium from Firm-level Data . . 8
1.5 A Model of Skill Premium with Intermediate Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5.1 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.6 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
i
1.6.1 Counterfactual Experiment: The Contribution Of Foreign Inter-
mediate Inputs On The Rise In The Skill Premium . . . . . . . . 20
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2 Education and Household Formation 23
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 The Nature of the Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 Empirical Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.1 Marital Dissolution and Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.2 Family Structure And Educational Outcome Of Children . . . . 33
2.4.3 Marriage Dissolution Rate By The Presence Of Children . . . . . 35
2.5 Summary of the Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6 A Model of Household Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6.1 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.6.2 Gain from Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.6.3 Education, Wage And Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.7 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.7.1 Preferences Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.7.2 Distribution of Bliss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.7.3 Wage Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.7.4 Estimation Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.8 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.8.1 Estimated Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.8.2 Extended Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3 Education and Entrepreneurship 47
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
ii
3.2 Evidence On Educational Differences In Occupational Choice . . . . . . 48
3.2.1 Evidence On Changes In Business Value By Educational Groups 49
3.3 Baseline Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3.1 Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3.2 Endowments and Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.3 Borrowing constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.4 Household Decision Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.5 Stationary Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.1 Fixed Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5.1 Changes in the Wage Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5.2 Skill complementarity with Managerial Ability . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Appendix A. Appendix for Chapter 1 66
A.1 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Appendix B. Appendix for Chapter 2 70
B.1 Marriage Dissolution Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
B.1.1 Female Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
B.1.2 Male Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
B.2 Regression Tables: Hazard of Divorce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
B.2.1 Female Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
B.2.2 Male Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
B.2.3 Divorce hazard over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
B.3 Family disruption and children’s college attainment . . . . . . . . . . . 75
B.3.1 Empirical Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
iii
List of Tables
1.1 Import Tariffs 1983-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Effective Rates of Protection in Ghana, 1987-1990 (Percent) . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Estimated Elasticities Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4 Estimated Substitution Elasticities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1 Cox Hazard Regression: implied hazard ratios (Female Sample) . . . . . 31
2.2 Cox Hazard Regression: implied hazard ratios (Male Sample) . . . . . . 31
2.3 Effect of Family Disruption on Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4 Probability of college completion by parents’ educational type and family
structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5 Divorce Rate By The Presence Of Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6 Wage Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.7 Estimated parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.8 Parental Education offers an advantage in rearing children . . . . . . . . 43
2.9 Heterogeneous preference over educational attainment of offspring . . . 45
3.1 Educational Differences in Occupational Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Total Value of Actively Managed Business (normalized) . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3 List of Fixed Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4 Estimated Parameters (8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5 Calibration Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.6 Changes in the Wage Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
iv
3.7 Targeting the Change in Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
A.1 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A.2 Distribution of firms by sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
A.3 Workforce composition by sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
A.4 Average Wages 1992-1998 by Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
B.1 Fraction of Marriages ending in divorce by their 10 anniversary, age at
marriage older than 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
B.2 Fraction of Marriages ending in divorce by their 10 anniversary, age at
marriage older than 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
B.3 Cox Hazard Regression coefficients (Female Sample) . . . . . . . . . . . 72
B.4 Cox Hazard Regression: implied hazard ratios (Female Sample) . . . . . 72
B.5 Cox Hazard Regression coefficients (Male Sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
B.6 Cox Hazard Regression: implied hazard ratios (Male Sample) . . . . . . 73
B.7 Effect of Family Disruption on Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
B.8 Estimated Parameters, Extended Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
v
List of Figures
1.1 Skill Premium and Expenditure Share on Foreign Intermediate Inputs . 10
1.2 Expenditure Share on Foreign Intermediate Inputs and Skill Composition 11
1.3 Model’s Prediction on the Skill Premium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4 The Contribution Of Foreign Intermediate Inputs On The Rise In The
Skill Premium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.1 Difference in divorce rate between college-educated women and non-college
educate women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2 Difference in divorce rate between college-educated men and non-college
educate men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 Marriage dissolution rate for Female Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4 Marriage dissolution rate for Male Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5 Distribution of Match Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.1 Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
B.1 Female Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
B.2 Male Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
vi
Chapter 1
Imported Intermediate Inputs
and the Skill Premium: Micro
Evidence from Ghana
1.1 Introduction
Following trade liberalization, many developing countries have experienced a sharp in-
crease in the skill premium, measured as the relative wage of skilled labor versus un-
skilled labor.1 This observation is at odds with the results of the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem, i.e., skill premium should decline – not increase – in low-skill abundant (devel-
oping) countries. Due to this discrepancy between the Heckscher-Olin model and data,
many leading hypotheses for the increase in the skill premium in developing countries
have relied on skilled-biased technological change as opposed to trade-based explana-
tions.2
1 Robbins [1996] finds a strong empirical association between trade liberalization and increases in
the skill premium. Behrman et al. [2003] report that the skill premium has increases both in developed
and developing countries. In all Latin American countries, the skill premium increased by almost 60
percent points from 1990-1998.
2 Recent explanations include Parro [2013], Burstein et al. [2011]. The key ingredient in this
model to generate a rise in the skill premium is the decline of the prices of equipment. The reduction
1
2In this paper, I argue that international trade has a sizable effect on the skill pre-
mium through its impact on the trade in intermediate inputs. Trade liberalization
generates a significant rise in the flow of goods, in particular, that of intermediate in-
puts, see e.g. Feenstra [1998]. In an environment where foreign intermediate inputs are
more complementary to skilled labor than to unskilled labor, increased access to foreign
intermediate inputs raises the demand for high-skilled workers, and lowers the demand
for low-skilled workers, and consequently, increases the skill premium.
I provide direct evidence that supports this mechanism using firm-level micro-data
from Ghana’s manufacturing sector. This detailed micro-data allows me to study the
changes in the composition of intermediate input used in production as well as the
workforce composition at the plant level. In my empirical analysis, I show a substantial
increase in both the skill premium and the expenditure share of foreign inputs across
firms. Moreover, firms that utilize more foreign intermediate inputs tend to employ a
higher share of skilled workers.
To quantify the effect of increasing trade in intermediate inputs on the rise of the
skill premium observed in the data, I build a model with two types of labor, high skilled
and low skilled, that interact with foreign and domestic intermediate inputs at varying
degrees of substitution. The model features a higher complementarity between foreign
intermediate inputs and skilled labor, than that between foreign intermediate inputs
and unskilled labor. To be more precise, the elasticity of substitution between foreign
intermediate inputs and skilled labor is lower than that between intermediate inputs and
unskilled labor. A key implication of this complementarity is that cheaper intermediate
inputs increase the marginal product of the skilled workers, but decrease the marginal
product of unskilled labor.
I exploit the variations in the combination of intermediate inputs, and workforce
in equipment prices leads to an increase in the demand for skilled workers, who are complements for
equipment, but it decreases the demand for unskilled workers, who were substitutes. However, this
observation is inconsistent with the expenditure share on equipment across time and across country (see
Bems [2008]).
3composition to estimate the crucial parameters of my model. My estimates are consis-
tent with the hypothesis that foreign intermediate inputs and skilled labor are comple-
ments. The elasticity of substitution between foreign intermediate inputs and skilled
labor is less than one. In contrast, skilled labor and unskilled labor display a much
higher elasticity of substitution (1.67), which is similar to the estimates of Krusell et al.
[2000] using U.S. aggregate data, and within the range of estimates from the micro
literature (see Johnson [1997] for a comprehensive survey on this elasticity).
The findings of this paper support the view that changes in the composition of foreign
intermediate inputs is a key factor in understanding the rise in the skill premium in
developing countries. The differences in the elasticity of substitutions imply that changes
in the observed composition of intermediate inputs have a significant and sizeable effect
on the rise of the skill premium. In my quantitative exercise, I find that greater access
to foreign intermediate inputs generates an increase of almost 30% in the skill premium
in Ghana, which in turn accounts for almost two-thirds of the observed rise.
The mechanism proposed in this paper is also supported by evidence from other
developing countries. Saravia and Voigtla¨nder [2012] find strong support for the com-
plementarity between foreign intermediate inputs and skilled workers using firm data
from Chile. They found that firms with higher intermediate imports tend to employ a
significantly larger share of skilled workers. Using detailed firm-level data from India,
Goldberg et al. [2010] argue that trade liberalization introduces new varieties of inputs
to domestic firms that were not previously available, and the access to this broader
variety allows domestic firms to introduce new products. If the introduction of new
products requires high skilled labor, trade liberalization may induce increases in the
skill premium.
The episode of trade liberalization in Ghana is particularly interesting because, like
many Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA), Ghana has implemented a set of restrictive
trade policies after its independence from British colonial rule in 1957 (Ackah and
Aryeetey [2012]). After a long period of stagnation in the 1970s, Ghana abandoned its
4“import-substituting” policies to become one of the first few SSA countries to enact
trade liberalization reforms under the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). These
major trade policies include tariff adjustments and elimination of the import licensing
system.3 By the late 1980s, with virtual elimination of import quotas and substantial
reduction in tariff levels, Ghana became one of the most liberal trade regimes in Africa
(Baah-Nuakoh and Teal [1993]) These trade policies transformed a close to autarkic
economy into an internationally engaged one within 5 years (see Cook [1999]). Most
interestingly, after this period of major trade reforms, the skill premium increased by a
factor of 1.5.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to a growing literature that highlights the role of trade in the rise
of the skill premium of developing countries.4
In terms of narrative, this paper is closely related to the work of Kurokawa [2011].
Motivated by evidence from Kehoe and Ruhl [2013] and Feenstra [1998], showing that
trade liberalization increases the trade in the extensive margin of manufacturing goods,
and that most of this increase has been in intermediate inputs, Kurokawa [2011] quan-
titatively evaluates the role of input varieties on the rise of the skill premium observed
in Mexico with a model of trade that features variety-skill complementarity. In his
framework, trade induces a higher demand for skilled labor by increasing the varieties
of intermediate inputs available.5 In his numerical exercise applied to the case of
Mexico, the increases in varieties account for over 10 percent of the actual skill premium
observed in the data. This numerical example shows that the potential of this channel
in generating rises in the skill premium is promising. However, it has yet to provide a
compelling empirical support for this mechanism.
3 Import license system is one of the main sources of trade flow restriction, see Kehoe [1995].
4 See Goldberg and Pavcnik [2007] for a comprehensive survey on this literature.
5 An alternative interpretation of this mechanism is that more variety involves more task to be
handled, that in turn corresponds to higher demand for skilled workers.
5A related set of papers emphasizes the role of trade on skill premium through a
distinct mechanism: the access to cheaper capital goods. The core of this argument is
based on the hypothesis of capital-skill complementarity formalized by Griliches [1969].
Burstein et al. [2011] and Parro [2013] argue that increases in the trade flow of equip-
ment, which are skill-complement, due to globalization may have contributed to the rise
of the skilled premium observed in developing countries. However, this mechanism im-
plies an increasing trend in the expenditure share on equipment in developing countries.
This is inconsistent with observations documented by Bems [2008], that the aggregate
expenditure shares on structure and equipment have remained close to constant over
time, and they are very similar in both rich and poor countries.
In addition, several empirical studies suggest that the role of capital did not play a
major role in the rise of skill premium observed in Ghana (see Bigsten et al. [1999]).
Akay and Yuksel [2009] find little support of capital-skill complementary hypothesis.
Their empirical estimates show little support for the capital-skill complementarity hy-
pothesis. Moreover, Bigsten et al. [1999] argue that the median values of investment to
value-added are less than 1 percent in the Ghana’s manufacturing sector. These findings
suggest that the accumulation of capital is too low to have played any significant role
in the rise of the skilled premium. Finally, expenditure on R&D in the manufactur-
ing sector in Ghana is not quantitatively relevant to have shift the skill premium (see
Navaretti et al. [1994]).
The paper is organized as follows. I provide a brief description of the trade liberal-
ization episode in Ghana in section (1.3). In section (1.4), I describe the key features of
the data. In section (1.5), I present a model of skill premium with intermediate inputs.
Section (1.6) describes the estimation procedure of the model, and reports the findings.
Finally, section (1.7) holds the conclusion.
61.3 The Case of Trade Policy Reform in Ghana
1.3.1 Trade Liberalization Policies
Like many Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, Ghana has had restrictive trade poli-
cies since its independence from British colonial rule in 1957 (see Ackah and Aryeetey
[2012]). After a long period of stagnation in the 1970s, Ghana abandoned its “import-
substituting” policies to become one of the first few SSA countries to enact trade liber-
alization reforms under the Economic Recovery Program (ERP).
By late 1980s, with the virtual elimination of import quotas and a substantial re-
duction in tariff levels, Ghana had become one of the most open trade regimes in Africa
(Baah-Nuakoh and Teal [1993]). Within a few years, these trade policies transformed
a nearly closed Ghana economy into one that was internationally engaged (see Cook
[1999]). In addition to the reductions of tariffs, the import license system was also
abolished in 1989. It is worth to mention that the removal of import license is crucial in
allowing the trade of goods. Using evidence from the trade liberalization episode from
Mexico, Kehoe [1995] shows that the import license system is one of the main sources
of trade flow restriction.
Table 1.1 shows the import tariffs in Ghana from 1983-2000. We can observe that
most items experienced a significant tariff reduction. The import tax on capital goods
and raw materials were decreased by almost 25 percent points. By 2000, Ghana tariff
structure has become relatively simple. Consumer goods had a uniform tariff of 10%,
and capital goods and raw materials, 5%, while tariffs on luxury goods were maintained
at 20%. Concessionary items were completely tariff exempt. It is important to mention
the complete elimination of tariff under concessionary items. There were a number of
programs under which manufacturers could apply for permission to apply raw materials
and intermediate inputs at concessionary duty rates (Bhasin [2012]).
7Table 1.1: Import Tariffs 1983-2000
Import Duty Rates (%) 1983-2000
Item 1983 1990 1995 2000
Concessionary 20 10 0 0
Consumer Goods 30 10 25 10
Capital Goods 30 10 10 5
Raw Materials 25-30 25 0 0-5
Luxury Goods 30 25 25 25
Source: Bhasin [2012]
Table 1.2: Effective Rates of Protection in Ghana, 1987-1990 (Percent)
Sector 1987 1990 Percent change
Food and Processing 81 46 -43.2
Garments 150 54 -64.0
Wood products 59 41 -30.5
Furniture 108 39 -63.9
Metal Processing 152 25 -83.6
Machinery 101 11 -89.1
Source: Berger and Consult [1991]
In addition to reduction of import tariffs, many industries in the manufacturing
sector were also exposed to more foreign competition. The effective rates of protection,
reported in table 1.2, fell significantly between 1987 and 1990.
To sum up, these major structural changes can be summarized as:
1. Elimination of import quotas and substantial reduction in tariff levels.
2. Abolishment of the import license system.
83. Substantial reduction in the import tax on raw materials and capital goods.
1.4 Facts on the Skill Premium
The data used in this paper is from the World Bank Regional Project on Enterprise
Development.6 The data set contains a panel survey of firms operating within
Ghana’s manufacturing sector. The survey was designed to represent the firm size
distribution across the major sectors of Ghana’s manufacturing sector. It covers firm
level information over the period 1992-2002. The survey contains information on fixed
assets, wage bill, composition of employees, and different measure of expenditure on
inputs. It contains sectors from food processing, textiles and garments, wood products
and manufacturing, metal products, and machinery.7 In addition, it also contains
a sub-sample of workers information in each firm. This feature allows me to match
employees data with the corresponding firms in the panel.
For practical purposes, I follow a standard practice in the literature in using non-
production and production classification for manufacturing in separating workers into
skilled and unskilled groups (see Forbes [2001] for a detailed survey on skill classification
in the literature). The production workers category is consisted of workers engaged in
maintenance, production, masters and apprentices, while the non-production workers
category is consisted of workers engaged in management, administration, sales, and su-
pervisors. It is generally assumed that nonproduction workers are predominantly skilled
workers. I use this separation throughout the paper in describing the skill composition
for each firm.
1.4.1 Key Facts on Trade and Skill Premium from Firm-level Data
In this section, I describe the key facts from the data. These facts are crucial for my
model’s quantitative implications. The key empirical findings are summarized as follows:
6 The data is available from the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford University.
7 For a more detailed description of the structure of this data set, see Teal [2002].
9(i) The skilled premium increased by a factor of 1.5 from 1992-1998 (ii) During the same
period, foreign intermediate inputs utilization increased threefold. (iii) There is a pro-
nounced positive correlation between producers skill intensity and foreign intermediate
inputs utilization.
Increasing Skill Premium And Increasing Expenditure Share On Foreign
Intermediate Inputs
Figure 1.1 plots the evolution of the skill premium and expenditure share in the Ghana
manufacturing sector from 1992-1998. From this figure, we can observe that a typical
high skilled worker in 1992 used to earn 2.6 times more than that of a low skilled worker
in 1992. By the end of 1998, the wage of a typical skilled worker is almost 4 times of the
wage of a low skilled worker. The wage differential increased by a factor of 1.5 in less
than 6 years. This implies an annual growth rate of the skill premium of 12 percent.
During the same period, the utilization of foreign intermediate inputs also displays
an increasing trend. Foreign intermediate inputs utilization increased threefold. Back
in 1992, the share of intermediate inputs that is foreign was 11 percent. The same
measure increased to 27 percent in 1998.
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Figure 1.1: Skill Premium and Expenditure Share on Foreign Intermediate Inputs
The Share Of Skilled Workers Is Increasing In The Expenditure On Foreign
Input
In this section, I analyze the skill intensity differences across firms by the utilization of
foreign inputs of each firm.
Here, I first rank firms by their expenditure share on foreign inputs and group them
into 10 bins. Within each bin, I compute the average share of skilled workers of those
firms. Figure 1.2 plots the share of skilled workers across different expenditure share
bins. Each point on the figure represents the average share of skilled workers of firms
for each bin. From the figure, we can see a pronounced positive correlation between the
share of skilled workers employed and the fraction of expenditure on foreign inputs. For
example, in firms where the average expenditure on foreign inputs was 80%, the average
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share of skilled labor was close to 45%; while for firms where the expenditure share was
20%, the skill composition was significantly lower, yielding an average of 15%. The
strong positive correlation between skill intensity and utilization of foreign intermediate
inputs suggests a strong complementarity between these two factors.
Figure 1.2: Expenditure Share on Foreign Intermediate Inputs and Skill Composition
In summary, this section provides evidence of a substantial increase in the skill
premium in Ghana manufacturing firms during an episode of trade liberalization. Si-
multaneously, the utilization of foreign intermediate inputs also increased across firms
during the same period. Moreover, at the cross section, I show that firms that employ
more foreign intermediate inputs tend to also employ more of skilled workers. This pos-
itive correlation suggests a strong complementarity between foreign intermediate inputs
and skilled labor.
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1.5 A Model of Skill Premium with Intermediate Inputs
1.5.1 Environment
The model consists of a small open economy, and the country is characterized by its
endowment of skilled labor H¯ and unskilled labor U¯ . The country produces domestic
intermediate inputs using unskilled labor, and imports foreign intermediate inputs at
international prices. I ignore balanced trade considerations, since they are not essential
to the analysis of the skill premium.
There are two sectors in the economy, one that produces a final consumption good
y, and another that produces domestic intermediate good (x). To simplify the environ-
ment, we assume that the final good y is not tradable.
Unskilled labor (u) can handle only the domestic intermediate good, but not the
foreign intermediate good inputs (x∗). In this environment, different types of labor
handle different combinations of intermediate inputs. This setup is close to that of
Kurokawa [2011], with the difference that in his environment, it requires more skill to
handle more variety of inputs. Whereas, in the setting of this paper, different types of
labor interacts with intermediate inputs at varying degrees of substitution. In a sense,
the difference in the setting lies in the intensive and extensive margin of intermediate
inputs traded.
Intermediate Domestic Input
The domestic intermediate good requires only unskilled labor to produce x.
The technology is given by the following constant returns to scale production func-
tion.
x =
u
b
(1.1)
where u is the demand for unskilled labor to produce the domestic intermediate
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good and b is the unit of unskilled labor requirement.
The intermediate input firm’s maximization problem is defined as follows
max
u
pxx− wuu (1.2)
s.t x =
u
b
Since this is a constant returns to scale production function, the zero profit condition
implies
x =
wuu
px
(1.3)
Final Consumption Good Producer
The final consumption good is non-tradable, it will only be used for domestic consump-
tion. The producer combines foreign intermediate inputs x∗ and domestic intermediate
inputs x to produce y. The final good requires the handling of foreign intermediate
inputs, and therefore requires skilled labor. This foreign intermediate good can be
purchase at price p∗.
The technology is given by the following constant returns to scale production func-
tion
y =
[
µxσ + (1− µ)
(
x∗ρ + hρ
)σ
ρ
] 1
σ
(1.4)
where y is the output of the final good, x, x∗ and h are the demand for the interme-
diate domestic good, intermediate foreign good and the skilled labor, respectively. The
parameters λ and µ governs the expenditures on intermediate inputs.
The curvature parameters ρ < 1 and σ < 1 determine the elasticities of substitution
between inputs. In this specification, the elasticity between domestic intermediate input
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x, and high skilled labor is given by 11−σ , and the elasticity of substitution between
foreign intermediate inputs and skilled labor is given by 11−ρ . Given our assumption,
that foreign intermediate inputs are skill complement, it requires that 11−σ >
1
1−ρ , i.e
σ > ρ. If either of these values equals to zero, the production function corresponds to
the Cobb-Douglas specification.
The final consumption good producers maximization problem is given by
max
x,x∗,h
y − pxx− p∗xx∗ − whh (1.5)
s.t y =
[
µxσ + (1− µ)
(
x∗ρ + hρ
)σ
ρ
] 1
σ
The FOC’s of the final goods producer’s profit maximization problem yields:
{x} :
[
µxσ + (1− µ)
(
x∗ρ + hρ
)σ
ρ
] 1
σ
−1
µxσ−1 = px (1.6)
{x∗} :
[
µxσ + (1− µ)
(
x∗ρ + hρ
)σ
ρ
] 1
σ
−1
(1− µ)
(
x∗ρ + hρ
)σ
ρ
−1
x∗(ρ−1) = p∗x (1.7)
{h} :
[
µxσ + (1− µ)
(
x∗ρ + hρ
)σ
ρ
] 1
σ
−1
(1− µ)
(
x∗ρ + hρ
)σ
ρ
−1
hρ−1 = wh (1.8)
The optimal ratio of intermediate input mix is given by
h =
(
p∗x
wh
) 1
1−ρ
x∗ (1.9)
and
x =
(
1− µ
µ
) 1
σ−1
(
px
p∗x
) 1
σ−1
([
1 +
(
h
x∗
)ρ] σ−ρρ(σ−1))
x∗ (1.10)
Similar to equation (1.10) we get the following relationship between x and h
x =
(
1− µ
µ
) 1
σ−1
(
px
wh
) 1
σ−1
([
1 +
(
x∗
h
)ρ] σ−ρρ(σ−1))
h (1.11)
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The Skill Premium in the Model
We can derive the skill premium using the fact that all factors of production are paid
according to their marginal products, the skill premium in this environment is as follows:
wuu
px
=
(
1− µ
µ
) 1
σ−1
(
px
wh
) 1
σ−1
([
1 +
(
x∗
h
)ρ] σ−ρρ(σ−1))
h
(
wu
px
)σ−1
=
1− µ
µ
(
px
wh
)[
1 +
(
x∗
h
)ρ]σ−ρρ (h
u
)σ−1
wh
wu
=
1− µ
µ
(
px
wu
)σ [
1 +
(
x∗
h
)ρ]σ−ρρ (h
u
)σ−1
(1.12)
Finally using the fact that px = bwu we define the skill premium as:
wh
wu
= bσ
1− µ
µ
[
1 +
(
x∗
h
)ρ]σ−ρρ (h
u
)σ−1
(1.13)
Differentiation of equation (1.13) indicates that as long as σ > ρ, which is the case
where foreign intermediate inputs are more complement to skilled workers than unskilled
worker, we have that
∂wh/wu
∂x∗
> 0 (1.14)
This last expression shows that as long as foreign intermediate inputs are skill-
complement, an increase in the quantities of foreign intermediate inputs corresponds to
increases in the demand for skilled workers, and hence, the skill premium.
Log-linearizing equation (1.13) , and dropping the constant term, yields:
ln
(
wh
wu
)
' σ − ρ
ρ
(
x∗
h
)ρ
+ (σ − 1) ln
(
h
x
)
(1.15)
Let gsp be the growth rate of the skill premium, and gz, be the growth rate of a
variable z, and differentiating with respect to time, we can express equation (1.15) in
term of growth rates.
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gsp = (σ − 1)(gh − gx) + (σ − ρ)
(
x∗
h
)ρ
(gx∗ − gh) (1.16)
Expression (1.16) resembles the standard wage premium equation in the literature
of wage inequality (see Krusell et al. [2000]) with the differences that it contains the
effect of the composition of intermediate inputs on the skill premium. Equation (1.16)
indicates that two channels affects the growth rate of the skill premium: (i) growth
rate of the supply of skilled workers relative to the growth rate of domestic intermediate
inputs, i.e h/x. (ii) and, the growth rate of foreign intermediate inputs relative to the
growth rate of skilled workers, i.e. x∗/h.
The first channel, (σ− 1)(gh− gx), that affects the skill premium is the supply effect
of the growth rate of skilled h labor relative to domestic inputs x. Given the assumption
in the model specification, that to handle domestic inputs it requires only low skilled
labor, this channel could be reinterpreted as the effect that the difference between the
growth rates of skilled labor versus unskilled labor has on the skill premium. The
relative supply of skilled labor has a negative effect on the growth rate of the skilled
premium since σ < 1.
The second channel, (σ − ρ) (x∗h )ρ (gx∗ − gh), is the foreign intermediate input com-
plementarity effect. This channel, in turn, can be divided into two components: the dif-
ference in the growth rate of foreign intermediate inputs and the growth rate of skilled
labor (gx∗ − gh), and the ratio of foreign intermediate inputs to skilled labor (x∗/h). If
foreign intermediate inputs are more complement to skilled labor than unskilled labor,
i.e. σ > ρ, the growth rate of foreign intermediate inputs relative to skilled labor in-
creases the skilled premium. Through this channel, the increase utilization of foreign
intermediate inputs increases the skill premium due to the complementarity effect.
The impact of (x∗/h)ρ on the growth rate of skill premium depends on the shape
of the isoquants of the production function. The parameter that governs the shape
isoquants is precisely ρ. If ρ > 0, meaning that foreign intermediate inputs and skilled
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labor are more substitutable than Cobb-Douglas, increases in the ratio of (x∗/h)ρ will
increases the skill premium over time, but it decreases when ρ < 0.
In sum, in this environment, changes in the composition of intermediate inputs have
an effect on the skill premium due to the feature of skill complementarity. Hence,
cheaper foreign intermediate inputs, induced by trade liberalization, affect the optimal
mixture of intermediate inputs, and in turn, the skill premium in the economy.
1.6 Estimation
In this section, I describe the estimation procedure.
There are two parameters in the model that are crucial for our question, the pa-
rameter of elasticity between different types of inputs and different types of labor,
Θ ≡ (σ, ρ). These two parameters determine how different combinations of interme-
diate inputs shape the skill premium observed in the economy. The remaining two
parameters are just b, and µ, the productivity of unskilled labor and the weight in the
CES nesting of the production function, respectively. These two parameters are just
scaling parameters, and they are not relevant in delivering the quantitative results on
growth rate of the skill premium.
I use a form of GMM for estimation. The estimate Θˆ ≡ (σˆ, ρˆ) minimize the distance
between the skill premium ŝpj,t in the model and the empirical counterparts spj,t for
each firm j and each period t:
min
Θ
g(Θ)′Wg(Θ) (1.17)
where g(Θ) = (g1(Θ), · · · , gN (Θ))′ and gk = spj,t − ŝpj,t.
The estimates are reported in table (1.3), and the implied substitution elasticities
are reported in table (1.4). The estimates from (1.3) are consistent with the theory of
complementarity between foreign intermediate inputs and skilled labor, i.e. σ > ρ.
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Table 1.3: Estimated Elasticities Parameters
Parameters Explanation Value
(S.E)
ρ Elasticity of Substitution Parameter between x∗ and h -0.069
σ Elasticity of Substitution Parameter between x and x∗ 0.404
Table 1.4: Estimated Substitution Elasticities
Estimated Substitution Elasticities Values
Between Skilled Labor
Domestic Intermediate Inputs 1/(1− σ) 1.678
Foreign Intermediate Inputs 1/(1− ρ) 0.936
As we can see from table (1.4), the implied elasticity of substitution between foreign
intermediate inputs and skilled labor is lower to that between foreign intermediate
inputs and unskilled labor. The elasticity of substitution between domestic intermediate
inputs and foreign intermediate is 1.67, which is also by symmetry of the CES nesting,
the elasticity of domestic intermediate inputs and skilled labor. Given that to produce
domestic intermediate inputs, it requires solely unskilled labor, this elasticity can be
interpreted as the elasticity between unskilled labor and skilled labor. The estimated
elasticity is close to the one reported by Krusell et al. [2000] using time series data from
the U.S. This estimate is also similar with the elasticity of 1.5 reported by Johnson
[1997], and within the range of values survey in Acemoglu [2002]. The estimate implies
that both type of labor are highly substitutable. Finally, the elasticity of substitution
between skilled labor and foreign intermediate is 0.93, which is slightly less substitutable
than Cobb-Douglas.
Now, I use the estimated elasticities from table (1.4), and use equation (1.16) that
compute the growth rate of the skill premium as a function of the growth rate of the
quantities, to assess how much these observables can account for the increase in the
skill premium observed during the period studied. I use the information on the time
series on expenditure on foreign intermediate inputs and domestic intermediate inputs,
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and the skill composition of the workforce, to compute the skill premium implied by
the model.
Figure 1.3: Model’s Prediction on the Skill Premium
Figure (1.3) shows both the normalized skill premium to its ratio in 1992 from the
data and the prediction of the model for the skill premium between 1992-1998. The
model is able to generate the steady increase in the skill premium observed in Ghana.
The model captures almost 75% of the rise in the relative wage. The model generates
a sharp rise in the skill premium between 1992 and 1994, which matches the similar
rise observed in the data. Thereafter, the model predicts a steady increase, while in the
data the increase was much pronounced.
Overall, the skill premium increased by almost 50%, while the model implies an
increase of almost 30%. The model underpredicts the rise in the skill premium by 20
percent points. Even abstracting away from any physical capital accumulation mecha-
nism, the model is quite successful in generating the trend and the level of the change
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in the skill premium. The prediction of the estimated benchmark model is broadly
consistent with the data.
1.6.1 Counterfactual Experiment: The Contribution Of Foreign In-
termediate Inputs On The Rise In The Skill Premium
Figure 1.4: The Contribution Of Foreign Intermediate Inputs On The Rise In The Skill
Premium
To quantify to what extent the increase access of foreign intermediate inputs has con-
tributed the rise in the skill premium, I perform a counterfactual experiment. I feed
into the model expenditure on foreign intermediate inputs observed in 1992, and hold
it constant throughout these periods. Figure (1.4) plots the normalized skill premium
implied by the model with actual data on the composition of intermediate inputs, and
with fixed composition from its level of 1992. The figure shows that once we remove
the changes in the composition of foreign intermediate inputs, the skill premium does
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not display an upward trend. Moreover, the skill premium would have dropped during
1993 -1994 by approximately 5%. This decline is generated by small changes in the skill
composition of the labor force, but its magnitude is minuscule. This exercise shows that
had the composition of intermediate input remained constant to its level of 1992, the
skill premium would have stayed the same to its level of 1992. This experiment shows
that complementarity between foreign intermediate inputs and skilled labor is the key
factor in understanding the rise of the skill premium.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper shows that international trade has sizable effect on the skill premium through
the trade in intermediate inputs. In my framework, the composition of intermediate in-
puts used in production is crucial in generating the sharp increase in the skill premium
observed in developing countries following trade liberalization. In this framework, dis-
tinct types of labor, high skilled and low skilled, interact with different degrees of substi-
tution with foreign and domestic intermediate inputs, i.e., the elasticity of substitution
between foreign intermediate inputs and skilled workers is lower than that between for-
eign intermediate inputs and unskilled workers. The implication of the model is that
cheaper intermediate inputs increase the marginal product of the skilled labor, but
decreases the marginal product of unskilled labor.
In addition, I provide direct micro-level evidence in support of this mechanism using
firm-level data from Ghana. I use variations in the composition of intermediate inputs,
and workforce to estimate my model. My estimates are consistent with the theory of
complementarity between foreign intermediate inputs and skilled labor. The elasticity
of substitution between foreign intermediate inputs and skilled labor is less than that
of Cobb-Douglas. However, skilled labor and unskilled labor display a much higher
elasticity of substitution, which is consistent with estimates using aggregate data from
the U.S, and within the range of estimates from the micro literature.
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Finally, I find that, with marked differences in substitution elasticities, changes in
the observed composition of inputs account for two-third of the rise in the skill premium
observed in the data. This paper supports the view that changes in the composition of
foreign intermediate inputs is a key factor in understanding the rise in the skill premium
in developing countries.
Future Research
Empirical studies suggest that imported inputs explain a significant fraction of the
introduction of new products in developing countries (see Goldberg et al. [2010]). Given
that intermediate inputs are an increasing share of the inputs traded across borders,
a natural step is to investigate how access to different variety of intermediate inputs
foments innovation of new products, which are usually skill-biased tasks. I leave for
future research how this channel may amplify the role of trade in the rise of the wage
inequality.
Chapter 2
Education and Household
Formation
2.1 Introduction
In this paper I ask what can account for the significant differences in the divorce rate
of first marriages between college and non-college educated people. In the U.S., the
divorce rate, measured as the fraction of marriages ending in divorce, is consistently
much lower for college educated people. This observed difference persists even after
controlling for the early entry into marriage of the non-college educated group.
Despite this prominent difference in divorce behavior across educational groups, little
research has explored the stabilizing effect of education on marital outcomes. These
observations are puzzling in the context of standard models of household formation,
which are based on the trade-off between gains from consumption and match quality.
In these models, the gain from joint consumption is lower for college educated people
due to decreasing returns in consumption, but the gain from match quality is higher.
Hence, when the quality of the current match deteriorates, college-educated people have
a higher incentive to dissolve the union. In addition, the outside option (the state of
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being single) for college-educated people is also higher given their higher earnings. Given
these two forces, the prediction of these models is that the propensity to divorce should
be higher, contrary to what we observed in the data, for people with higher levels of
education.
This paper makes two contributions. First, I document that the presence of a child
has a strong influence on the divorce behavior across educational groups, especially for
those couples in which the father is college educated. Couples with children divorce less
than couples without children regardless of their college attainment level. Furthermore,
college-educated parents divorce much less than non-college-educated parents (the differ-
ence is approximately 14 percent), whereas the opposite holds true for college educated
couples without children (the gap is 12 percent). In addition, I provide evidence, which
suggests that divorce reduces the chances of college completion for children. Moreover,
this reduction is much more pronounced for children with college-educated parents than
for those with non-college educated parents.
This additional cost for college-educated parents, in the form of a lower likelihood
that their offspring complete their college degree, provides extra stabilization effect.
Secondly, I develop and estimate a model of household formation where parents differ
in gender, education, and preferences over the college attainment of their offspring. I
use the model to assess the roles of the two mechanisms in accounting for the divorce
patterns across educational groups: (1) the higher destruction in chances of college
attainment. (2) heterogeneity in preferences for educated offspring.
I find that a simple version of the model that takes into account the higher costs
for college-educated parents accounts for 70 percent of the divorce gap between col-
lege and non-college educated parents observed in the data. This result supports the
findings from recent work by Lundberg and Pollak [2013], where they suggest that
college-educated couples use marriage as a commitment device to support high levels of
investment in children.
Understanding these demographic differences is important because the household
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structure in which children are brought up greatly impacts their success later in life
(for a comprehensive survey on the impact of single mother families on the outcome of
children see Sigle-Rushton and McLanahan [2004]). Neal and Johnson [1996] found that
the skill gap between white and black adults account for almost all of the observed black-
white wage gap, and this skill gap, in turn, can be traced back to observable differences
in the family background. In a related study, Regalia and Rios-Rull [2001] suggest that
changes in the marital status composition of the population have an amplifying effect
on the inter-generational earnings correlation: being born into a single-female-headed
household increases the likelihood of becoming a low-earning type adult by 30%.
Since the 1980s, the difference in the marital dissolution rate has been increasing
between college and non-college educated people. The divorce rate has plummeted
for college-educated couples since 1980, while little has changed for couples without a
college degree (McLanahan [2004]). This demographic shift was the key driver in the
decline of the crude divorce rate during this period. A natural step following this paper
is to ask what has changed over time that can account for these different behaviors.
I organize the paper as follows. In section 2.4, I describe the empirical findings
on divorce behavior across educational groups, and the empirical relationship between
family disruption and children’s college attainment . In section 2.5, I highlight the key
features of the data. Section 2.6, I describe a model of household formation and divorce.
Section 2.7 describes the estimation procedure of the model. Section 2.8 reports the
results. Finally, section 2.9 holds the conclusion.
2.2 Literature Review
Empirical evidence on the stabilizing role of education on marital stability has been
widely documented in the literature. Heckman et al. [2009] found that graduating from
college decreases the probability of divorce even after controlling for other characteristics
- namely cognitive skills - that may be correlated with schooling decisions. Bramlett
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and Mosher [2002] also found that married women who have attained higher levels of
education are less likely to divorce. In a related study, Kim [2012] found that while the
divorce rate is lower for most white females with a college degree, higher education does
not confer the same protection in marriage for African-American women.
Growing up in a single parent or stepparent family appears to have strong adverse
effects on the educational attainment of children. McLanahan [1999] explored the impact
of family structure on children’s college attainment and found that the effect of family
disruption1 is particularly costly for children with college-educated parents. For these
families, a family disruption increases the high school dropout risk by a factor of 3
and teen birth risk by a factor of 5. For those who live in disrupted families, the
risk of dropping out of high school and becoming a teen mother is around 1.5 and 2
times greater, respectively. The success rate of children with parents with lower levels of
education is rather small on average, regardless of their family structure. It appears that
family disruption takes away the advantages of having parents with a college education.
It places a children with divorced parents on par with children whose parents have never
been to college but have remained together.2
Piketty [2003] suggests that these previous estimates of divorce cost on the success
of children may in fact be the outcome of the adverse effect of parental conflicts rather
than the impact of family structure. In other words, the sample of children whose
parents are divorced may be composed of children with lower performance due to the
adverse effect of parental conflict during marriage. In a recent paper, Tartari [2006]
addresses this concern, she found that the success of children of divorced parents would
have been higher had parents not been divorced. In a related study, Ginther and Pollak
[2003] found that children raised in traditional nuclear families not only tend to have
better educational outcomes than stepchildren from stable blended families, but they
1 A family disruption is a transition from living in a two-parent family to a one-parent family by
the age of sixteen (including children born to unmarried parents).
2 Estimates are based on logistic regression models and control for race, sex of child, mother’s
education, father’s education, place of residence and number of siblings.
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also tend to do better than the joint biological children from stable blended families.
2.3 The Nature of the Puzzle
Consider a simple model of marital formation where marriage generates two sources of
benefits: (i) increasing returns to consumption while living with a partner. (ii) the
value of match quality derived from living with a spouse.
The trade-off between these two potential gains can be represented as follows:
U(c, b;φ) = U [cφ] + b (2.1)
where U(c, b;φ) is the utility derived from consumption c scaled up by φ (via
economies of scale), and match quality b. This representation takes into account the
trade-off between money and love (see Fernandez et al. [2005], Regalia and Rios-Rull
[2001], and Greenwood and Guner [2004]).
Since the marginal gain from joint-consumption is decreasing in the level of earnings,
hence also decreasing in the level of education, in this setting, college-educated people
have a higher propensity to dissolve the union whenever the quality of the current
matches deteriorates. This prediction of the model, that the propensity to divorce is
higher for college-educated people, is the opposite of the empirical facts documented
below.
2.4 Empirical Facts
2.4.1 Marital Dissolution and Education
I document the empirical relationship between educational attainment and marital dis-
solution by using data from Wave 2 Topical Modules of the 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels
of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), conducted by the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau. SIPP contains comprehensive information on marital history for men and
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women aged 15 and over in the United States. It also provides information about both
spouses for people who are currently married. I focus on the outcome of first marriages
so that the hazard of divorce reflects the average person’s marital experience rather
than the average of a marital experience. Additionally, those who marry at an early
age (20-24) have the highest rate of divorce. In order to control for differences in earlier
entry into marriage, in much of my analysis, I focus on people who where older than 24
years old when they first married.
Figure (2.1) and (2.2) show the difference in the divorce rate across educational
groups for women and men, respectively. The figures highlight that for each cohort of
marriage there is a difference in the divorce rate between college-educated women and
their counterparts. By the 15th anniversary, the difference in divorce rate is approxi-
mately 6 percent. This is consistent with recent findings by Isen and Stevenson [2010].
They found that college-educated women are less likely to marry than their less-educated
counterparts. However, when they do marry, they are less likely to divorce.
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Figure 2.1: Difference in divorce rate between college-educated women and non-college
educate women
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Figure 2.2: Difference in divorce rate between college-educated men and non-college
educate men
The difference in the divorce rate between college and non-college educated people
persists even one takes into account the higher age at first marriage of the college-
educated group. To demonstrate the pervasiveness of the role in education in determin-
ing differences in divorce rate, I estimate empirically a Cox Hazard regression of the
following form:
log hi(t) = log h(t) + βXi + θi + δiy (2.2)
where hi(t) is the person i
′s hazard of divorce after t years of marriage, Xi are the
covariates (education and race, and other demographic characteristics), δiy is a vector
of variable indicating the year when the person first got married and θi dummies for age
at marriage. This specification requires that the impact of the covariates on the hazard
rate of divorce to be proportional. Treating age at marriage as a group of dummies
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variables allows for the estimates to capture a non-linear relationship between age at
marriage and divorce. It is widely documented that marriages beginning at age of 18
are twice as likely to end in divorce than those starting when they are 22 (see Becker
et al. [1977], Rotz [2011], Lehrer [2008]).
Table (2.1) and (2.2) below report the hazard ratio of divorce for the female and male
sample, respectively. college-educated people have approximately 60% of the hazard
that non-college educated have of divorce. The estimated hazard ratio was 0.60 for
both groups, indicating that college-educated person have a 40% lower risk of divorce
than non-college educated person. This relative hazard rate implies that, by the 10th
anniversary, the dissolution rate of marriage for college-educated people is 10% lower
than that of non-college educated people. Figure (2.3) and Figure (2.4) show the implied
dissolution rate for first marriages for females and males, respectively.
Table 2.1: Cox Hazard Regression: implied hazard ratios (Female Sample)
Empirical Estimation
Haz. Ratio Std. Error
Education at Marriage .737*** .018
Presence of a Child .304*** .005
Other covariates: race, age at marriage and year of marriage.
Table 2.2: Cox Hazard Regression: implied hazard ratios (Male Sample)
Empirical Estimation
Haz. Ratio p-value Std. Error
Education at Marriage .618 .000 .014
Other covariates: race, age at marriage and year of marriage.
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Figure 2.3: Marriage dissolution rate for Female Sample
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Figure 2.4: Marriage dissolution rate for Male Sample
2.4.2 Family Structure And Educational Outcome Of Children
To capture the correlation between family structure and the educational outcomes of the
children, Consider the following probit model that regress college completion outcome
on the set of variables Xi that includes gender, race, and an indicator for the education
attainment of his parents, and family disruption.
Probit(Yi) = α+ βXi − i (2.3)
A child is raised in a disrupted family if he did not live with his biological parents
through the age of 18. Table (2.3) shows the estimates of the probit regression.
Table (2.4) displays the probability of college completion conditional on parents
34
Table 2.3: Effect of Family Disruption on Children
Coef. Std. Error
Mother college educated .572* .035
Father college educated .711* .032
Family Disruption .410* .024
Race .109* .011
Gender .198* .023
Constant –1.765* .059
No. of cases 19269
* pvalue <0.05
Source: NLSY 1979-1997
educational backgrounds and family structure of the children.3 The estimates suggest
that the intergenerational correlation of college attainment is strong - the education
of the parents is strongly correlated to that of their offspring. Children from college-
educated parents that had stayed in their marriage have approximately 60 percent
chance of obtaining a college degree, while the chances for children from couples with
lower levels of education are under 15 percent.
Table 2.4: Probability of college completion by parents’ educational type and family
structure
Parent’s Education Family Structure
Mother / Father Disrupted Intact Difference
N/N 0.075 0.151 0.076
N/C 0.232 0.374 0.142
C/N 0.192 0.322 0.131
C/C 0.436 0.599 0.162
Note: The probability are adjusted for race, sex, mother’s education, father’s education,
number of siblings, and place of residence.
3 All probabilities are adjusted for the demographic backgrounds of the children.
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However, the impact of family disruption on the educational attainment of children
varies according to the specific characteristics of their parents. The success rate of
children of parents with lower levels of education is slim in general, regardless of their
family structure (7 versus 1 percent). On the other hand, for children of highly educated
parents, family disruption has a greater effect on their educational attainment. Divorce
reduces the chances of college completion for children of highly educated parents by 16
percent, while the same reduction is only 7 percent for children of parents with lower
levels of education.
2.4.3 Marriage Dissolution Rate By The Presence Of Children
In this section, I show that the presence of a child has a strong stabilizing effect on
marriage, especially for those couples in which the father is college educated. To control
for early marriages, I limit the sample to all women who married at the age of 25. Those
who married with a premarital birth are also excluded from the sample.
A nice feature of SIPP data is that it contains comprehensive data on marital his-
tory, but it does not contain information on the characteristics of their spouses unless
the marriage stays intact. Instead, I use data from NSFG 1995 to show the divorce
pattern across different mixtures of marriages. NSFG is a cross-sectional survey that
also provides retrospective information on marriage and divorce. However, the sample
includes the population between the ages of 15 and 44. This difference in the age struc-
ture of the NSFG sample implies on average a higher divorce rate for any given duration
of marriage.4 Given this discrepancy, I limit my analysis on the outcome of marriage
at a shorter duration (15th anniversary).
4 The NSFG samples are limited to age 44, the marriage outcome of those who got married at age
25 is not observed by the 20th anniversary.
36
Table 2.5: Divorce Rate By The Presence Of Children
Marriage dissolution rate by the 15th anniversary
With a child
Women/Men Yes No Difference
N/N 30.3% 37.1% 6.80%
(0.10%) (0.07%)
N/C 13.4% 41.8% 28.40%
(0.05%) (0.16%)
C/N 31.3% 55.2% 23.83%
(0.14%) (0.19%)
C/C 17.6% 49.2% 31.59%
(0.08%) (0.14%)
Source: NSFG 1995. Marriages with a premarital birth are excluded (age at marriage older 24).
Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.
Table (2.5) shows the fraction of first marriages that ends in divorce by their 15th
anniversary by presence of a child and educational attainment of the spouse. The first
column indicates the combinations of education attainment of the spouses. We can
observe 3 marked patterns. (1) couples without children divorce more than couples
with children regardless of their educational levels. (2) The educational level of the
father has a greater effect on marriage stability when the marriage involve the birth of
a child. The divorce rate for parents where the mother has a higher educational level
than the father is 18 percent more than that of parents where the mother has a lower
educational level. (3) For the group of marriages that does not involve the birth of a
child, the divorce rate increases as the education of the spouses increases. The divorce
rate is the highest for the mixture of marriages that involves a college-educated wife
and a non-college educated husband.
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2.5 Summary of the Evidence
In this section, I summarize the evidence from previous sections.
1. The divorce rate is increasing in the couples’ level of education when the marriage
does not involve the birth of a child. The gap is 12 percent.
2. College-educated parents divorce less than non-college educated parents. The gap
is approximately 13 percent.
3. The divorce rate for parents in which the mother has a higher level of education
than the father is 17 percent higher than that of parents where the father is more
educated.
4. College-educated parents divorce much less than couples without children with
similar college attainment level. The difference in divorce rate is approximately
30.
5. Family disruption reduces the chances of college completion for children. More-
over, the reduction is much larger for children of highly -educated parents. Fam-
ily disruption reduces the chances of college completion for children of college-
educated parents by 16 percent, while the same reduction is only 7 percent for
children of non-college educated parents.
2.6 A Model of Household Formation
In this section, I develop a simple model of household formation to account for the facts
described in previous sections.
Consider a household composed of females and males g ∈ {m, f} that can be college
educated or non-college educated e ∈ {c, d}. A household may have a child or not
n ∈ {0, 1}. At the beginning of the period, they draw a marital bliss shock b and they
decides whether to stay married or divorce q ∈ {m, s}. The match quality is specific and
38
i.i.d. drawn from a density function f(b) (the details of this process will be explained in
section 2.7.2). This match quality effectively increases the value of being married and
it is symmetric between spouses. This setting is similar to that of Aiyagari et al. [2000].
2.6.1 Preferences
The utility of being married for a couple with a child with education level (e, e∗) is given
by
Um(e, e∗, c, n, b) = Um[cφ(n)] + b+ χn log(
∑
e′
Pm(e
′|e, e∗)we′) (2.4)
The utility of being married is composed of three components. First, the direct
utility derived from consumption c adjusted by φ(n) via economies of scale. Second,
the draw of marital bliss, and third, the utility that derives from the college attainment
of their children, where χ is the utility weight that a household place on the college
attainment of their offspring. The probability of college attainment of their offspring is
given by Pm(e
′|e, e∗), which depends on the college attainment of the parents and their
decision staying in marriage.
The utility of divorcing with a child is given by
Us(e, e
∗, c, n) =U s[cφ(n)] + χn log(
∑
e′
Ps(e
′|e, e∗)we′) (2.5)
The utility of being single is the sum of two components. The first component
corresponds to the utility attained from c, adjusted by φ(n) via economies of scale -
adjusted for the absence of an adult in a family. The second component consists of
the utility derived from the college attainment of their offspring, where χ is the utility
weight that a household put on the college attainment of their child. In this state, not
only the household experiences a reduction in the gain from joint consumption, but also
a decrease in the probability of college attainment of its offspring, given by Ps(e
′|e, e∗).
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2.6.2 Gain from Marriage
In this framework, marriage delivers three types of potential gains for the household,
(i) the value of bliss derived from living together, e.g b > 0 (ii) increasing returns to
consumption while living with a partner. (iii) marriage generate difference in the return
of educational attainment of a child.
The decision rule to the problem is a threshold for the marital bliss b¯(e, e∗, n), such
that the value of staying in marriage at that value is equal to the value of ending the
match, e.g. U(e, e∗, c, n, b¯) = U(e, e∗, c, n). These cut-offs determine the divorce rate
across different type of couples.
2.6.3 Education, Wage And Consumption
Education in this economy determines the wage and also gives an advantage to parents
in educating their children. This economy incorporates the wage structure observed in
the data, namely, wage premium and gender premium. The wage, we,g, is indexed by
education and gender. In addition to these characteristics, the marital status affects
directly the total income of the household. I make the assumption that in marriage, the
spouses pool perfectly their incomes; and upon divorce, the total income is split evenly
among the couple.
c =
 w
f
e + w
g
e if married
(wfe + w
g
e)/2 if divorce
(2.6)
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2.7 Estimation
2.7.1 Preferences Specification
The current utility is of a CRRA form with a risk aversion parameter of σ = 2 and the
equivalence scales, φ, are taken directly from the OECD.
φ(n) =
 1 + 0.7 + n ∗ 0.5 if married1 + n ∗ 0.5 if divorce (2.7)
2.7.2 Distribution of Bliss
The property of the distribution of bliss is approximated with a mixture of two nor-
mal distributions f(x) =
∑2
i=1 pif(x|µi, σi). This mixture allows for a flexible density
approximation. This specification requires 5 parameters, hence 5 moments from the
data.
2.7.3 Wage Structure
The wage structure in this economy features a gender gap premium and return to
education. I normalize the wage of college educated males to be one. The gender gap
for the college educated group is around 26 percent. The wage premiums for females
and males are 30 percent and 46 percent, respectively.
Table 2.6: Wage Structure
College Educated Non-college Educated
Female 0.744 0.402
Male 1.000 0.546
Source: Current Population Survey
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2.7.4 Estimation Procedure
I estimate the model by targeting the main features of divorce behavior of non-college
educated women, and college-educated women without children. Specifically, estimation
consists of the vector of 6 parameters:
θ ≡ {p, µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2, χ} (2.8)
These 6 parameters, θ ≡ {p, µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2, χ} , of the model are estimated jointly by
matching 6 moment conditions, the fraction of marriages that ends in divorce of couples
without children (both college and non-college couples). It is important to emphasize
that the information on the divorce rate for college-educated parents is not used in the
estimation. Rather, the estimation procedure uses the information on the divorce rate
for couples without children (college and non-college couples), and the divorce rate for
non-college educated parents to identify these parameters. In this version of the model,
parents care equally about the success of their children.
The estimates θˆ solve
min
θ
g(θ)′Wg(θ) (2.9)
where g(θ) is the distance between the empirical divorce rate and the simulated
divorce data implied by the model, and W , the weighting matrix (here we use the
identity matrix).
2.8 Findings
2.8.1 Estimated Parameters
The parameters estimates are reported in table (2.7). From the estimates, we can infer
that parents care a lot about the college completion of her children. They are willing
to forgo 13 percent of consumption to increase the odds of college attainment for their
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children by 10 percent. Figure (2.5) shows the distribution of bliss estimated from the
model.
Table 2.7: Estimated parameters
Parameter Estimates
Mixture weight p 0.21
Mixture parameters µ1 0.70
Mixture parameters µ2 0.00
Mixture parameters σ1 8.66
Mixture parameters σ2 7.03
Weight on college completion χ 78.54
Figure 2.5: Distribution of Match Quality
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The performance of the model are reported in table (2.8). The model fits well the
divorce behavior across educational groups. The model captures the positive relation-
ship between divorce and education for couples without children. In the model, higher
college attainment increases the outside option of being single. In other words, a stan-
dard model where education only plays the role of higher wages is capable of generating
the divorce behavior for couples without children.
Table 2.8: Parental Education offers an advantage in rearing children
Fraction of Marriages ending in divorce (15th anniversary) Data Model
Mother - Father
(N, N) without children 0.371 0.420
(N, N) with children 0.303 0.284
(N, C) without children 0.418 0.445
(N, C) with children 0.134 0.150
(C, N) without children 0.552 0.520
(C, C) without children 0.492 0.471
Implication of the model (untargeted moments)
(C, N) with children 0.313 0.206
(C, C) with children 0.170 0.185
We now use the estimates to look at the prediction of the model for divorce behavior
for college educated mothers. Notice that these moments of the data were not used to
estimate the model. What is the prediction of the model for the divorce rate of college
educated mothers?
The model predicts a 19 percent of divorce rate for the college educated parents,
very similar to the data counterpart of 17 percent. In other words, the higher costs
for college-educated parents accounts for 70 percent of the divorce gap between college
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and non-college educated parents observed in the data. The success in the model in
generating this pattern is well captured because the divorce rate for parents with the
educational mixture (N,C) is quite low (13 percent). This suggests that the importance
that parents, regardless of their education level, place on the success of their children
has a stabilization effect.
However, the model underestimates the divorce rate for parents where the mother
has a higher level of education. The model predicts a divorce rate of 20 percent, whereas
the data counterpart is 30 percent. If college-educated mothers care equally about the
college attainment of their children, they should divorce less regardless of the attributes
of the father. In other words, the higher cost of divorce of college-educated couples,
as measured by a reduction in the chances of college completion for their children, is
sufficient to induce educated parents to stay in marriage. But it fails to account for the
divorce rate of parents where the mother is more educated than the father. Considering
explicitly the attributes of the father provides a better understanding of divorce patterns
across educational groups.
To sum up,
1. The higher reduction in the chances of college completion for children with college-
educated parents accounts for 70 percent of the divorce gap between educational
groups.
2. The model underestimates the divorce rate for parents where the mother is more
educated than the father (31 percent in the data versus 21 percent in the model).
In other words, if they value the college attainment equally, they would divorce
much less regardless of the attribute of the father. Hence, considering explicitly
the attributes of the father improves the understanding of the divorce behavior of
this group.
3. Parents care a lot about the college completion of her children. They are willing
to forgo 13 percent of consumption to increase the odds of college attainment for
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their children by 10 percent.
2.8.2 Extended Model
Now we explicitly target the divorce behavior for college-educated parents where both
are college educated. In this exercise, parents care differently about the college attain-
ment of their children. Formally, we implement this theory by letting χ be indexed by
the education of the parent, in particular, that of the father. Table (2.9) shows one of
the best outcomes.
I find that giving heterogeneity in preference for college completion of their offspring
does provide a better picture of the divorce rate of parents where the mother is more
educated. This extra incentive in the model increases the divorce rate of this group to
37 percent, 6 percent more than the counterparts in the data.
Table 2.9: Heterogeneous preference over educational attainment of offspring
Model with Heterogeneous preference over educational attainment of offspring
Fraction of Marriages ending in divorce (15th anniversary) Data Model
Mother - Father
(N, N) without children 0.371 0.400
(N, N) with children 0.303 0.320
(N, C) without children 0.418 0.445
(N, C) with children 0.134 0.150
(C, N) without children 0.552 0.520
(C, C) without children 0.492 0.471
(C, C) with children 0.170 0.175
Implication of Model (untargeted moment)
(C, N) with children 0.313 0.370
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These two exercises support the notion that the benefits of marriage conferred on
college-educated parents in rearing children is the primary factor in shaping the differ-
ences divorce behavior across educational groups.
2.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I developed and estimated a model of household formation to assess
to what extent the higher costs of divorce for college educated parents, in terms of
reduction in the chances of college attainment of their offspring, can explain the divorce
patterns across educational groups. I estimate that these costs are capable of accounting
70 percent for the divorce gap observed in the data. These higher costs can explain why
college-educated parents divorce less than childless college educated couples. But it is
not sufficient to account for the high divorce rate of parents where the mother has a
higher level of education. It seems that it is important to explicitly consider the role
of heterogeneity of preferences for college educated children. This finding suggests that
the benefit of marriage conferred on college-educated parents in rearing children is the
primary factor in shaping the differences in divorce.
Chapter 3
Education and Entrepreneurship
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, I investigate the determinants of occupational choice of different educa-
tional groups. Up until the early 1980s, both college graduates and high school graduates
had the same propensity of becoming entrepreneurs. The fraction of these two groups
who are entrepreneurs was 13%. However, after the 1980s, there was a substantial gap
between the number of college and high school entrepreneurs. In 2010, the fraction
of college graduates who were entrepreneurs increased to 20%, while the same fraction
stayed at 14% for high school graduates.
In this chapter, I pose a model of educational choice and occupational choice to
unravel the underlying economic forces in shaping the increasing gap of entrepreneurial
entry between college graduates and high school graduates. Specifically, I evaluate
quantitatively the role of complementarity between education and managerial talent in
accounting educational differences in entrepreneurship entry. The findings of this paper
suggest that an increasing complementarity between managerial ability and education
is the main driver of the gap in the entrepreneurship entry.
This paper is complementary to Akyol and Athreya [2009] and Terajima [2004]
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where they extend the basic model of precautionary savings, including Huggett [1993]
and Aiyagari [1994], to incorporate entrepreneurs and occupational choice to study the
role of financial friction in generating high accumulation of wealth and business size
distribution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the trend in the en-
trepreneurship entry behavior across educational groups. Section 3.3 describes the
baseline model. Section 3.4 and 3.5 report the estimation of the model and discuss
the quantitative results. Lastly, section 3.6 holds the conclusions.
3.2 Evidence On Educational Differences In Occupational
Choice
In this section, I show the empirical findings on the changes of occupational choices
experienced by different educational groups over the period of 1983 to 2010. For this
purpose, I use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). I use a standard
definition of entrepreneurship from the literature (see De Nardi et al. [2007] and Cagetti
and Nardi [2006]). The unit of observation is the household, and I classify entrepreneurs
as those households in which the head is self-employed, owing a business, and having
an active management role in the firm. By imposing the extra condition that the
entrepreneur takes an investment in the business, it is likely to exclude those who are
self-employed because of limited outside option.
Table (3.1) shows the fraction of people who are entrepreneurs by educational levels
in 1983 and 2010. The table shows that, back in the 1980s, the fraction of high school
graduates who are entrepreneurs was very similar to that of college graduates (13%).
However, the entry into entrepreneurship has increased substantially for college gradu-
ates over the past 30 years, while it remains virtually constant for high school graduates.
The gap in the entrepreneurship entry behavior of these two groups has widened over
the past 30 years mainly due to an increase in the number of entrepreneurs among
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college graduates.
Table 3.1: Educational Differences in Occupational Choice
Educational Attainment Entrepreneurs (%)
1983 2010 Change (Percentage points)
College Graduates 13.2 20.0 +6.8
High School Graduates 13.0 14.8 +1.8
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances (1983-2010)
3.2.1 Evidence On Changes In Business Value By Educational Groups
In this section, I document the cross-sectional differences between college graduates and
high school graduates entrepreneurs over time. SCF reports the net worth position for
different households over time. Business net worth is calculated as net equity of business
were sold today, plus loans from households to business, minus loans from business to
the household not previously reported, plus value of personal assets used as collateral
for business loans.
Table 3.2: Total Value of Actively Managed Business (normalized)
Educational Attainment 1983 2010
College Graduates 2.08 3.39
High School Graduates 1.00 1.10
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances (1983-2010)
I normalize the actual value of actively managed business relative to the value of
the high-school group in the 1980s. Table (3.2) reports the cross-sectional differences
in size of their business by educational group over time. Back in the 1980s, the value
of the business for college graduate entrepreneurs was considerably larger than their
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counterparts. On average, the value of a college graduate entrepreneur was twice as
large. Moreover, that difference has grown over time. In 2010, on average, the value
of a business from a college graduate was three times as much as that of a high school
graduate.
3.3 Baseline Model
In this section, I describe a simple model of educational and occupational choice. In this
simple model, education affects the earnings and the managerial skill productivity. This
version of the model is closely related to Quadrini [2000], Cagetti and Nardi [2006], and
Terajima [2004] in the sense that it highlights the role of financial friction in determining
the entry into entrepreneurship.1
3.3.1 Demographics
The model features a stochastic life structure. Each generation of agents differs in
education e ∈ {c, h}. They can be either entrepreneurs or workers d = {m,w} with
an asset position a ≥ 0. There is a unit measure of households, and they are subject
to idiosyncratic shocks as in Bewley [1977], Aiyagari [1994], and Huggett [1993]. The
economy does not feature any aggregate uncertainty.
Each household faces a constant probability of φ of dying. When a generation dies,
an offspring is born and takes over the household assets position a, and occupational
status d ∈ {m,w} for one period. The education of the offspring, denoted by e′, depends
upon the investment x that the parent household incurred in the previous period. In-
vestment in children increases the probability of educational attainment of the offspring.
I denote this education production function as e′ = H(x).
1 Recent empirical findings from Hurst and Lusardi [2004] cast doubts on the role of liquidity
constraints as the key determinant of entry into entrepreneurship .
51
3.3.2 Endowments and Technology
Households are endowed with 1 unit of labor, which they can supply to the market
and receive a wage w, or used in their own project. In addition to labor endowment, a
person with education e is endowed with two types of abilities: entrepreneurial ability
ze ∈ Ze, and working ability ye ∈ Ye. The entrepreneurial ability ze follows a first-order
Markov process with transition matrix Γ(z′e|ze). The process for y is modeled to feature
the wage distribution in the data.
As in Quadrini [2000], the economy has two sectors producing homogeneous goods.
One sector is composed of entrepreneurs firms, and one is composed by non-entrepreneurial
firms. In both sectors, capital stocks depreciate at a constant rate δ.
Entrepreneurial Project
An entrepreneur can borrow and invest in physical capital k in a technology denoted by
zek
ν , where 0 < ν < 1. This technology features decreasing returns in investment, and
the process of ze governs the marginal and average returns on capital (as in Lucas Jr
[1978]). If the household choose to invest k = 0, then she considered as a worker. If a
household decides to enact a project, and she chooses a positive level of physical capital
k > 0, then she will receive revenue plus the level of capital net of depreciation.
q(ze, k) = zek
ν + (1− δ)k 0 < ν < 1 (3.1)
Corporate Technology
The corporate sector or non-entrepreneurial sector is modeled with a standard Cobb-
Douglas production function:
F (Kc, Lc) = K
α
c L
1−α
c 0 < α < 1 (3.2)
where Kc and Lc are capital stock and labor inputs in the non-entrepreneurial sector.
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3.3.3 Borrowing constraints
Households in this economy can invest at most a level of capital that relies on their level
of asset a in the entrepreneurial project. Specifically, the agent can borrow to invest at
most (1 + κ), κ ∈ {0, 1}, times their asset position a. Hence, the amount of asset that
an entrepreneur can borrow is κa, at an interest rate r.
3.3.4 Household Decision Problem
Household maximizes the its lifetime expected utility derived from consumption.
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct) (3.3)
Household starts the period with a given education level e, asset position a, and
managerial ability ze, and working ability ye. Thus, the individual state is summarized
by (e, a, ze, ye). In any period, whenever a parent is replaced by his offspring, the
educational attainment of the offspring is determined by the investment incurred by
the household. In this setting, individuals care about their descendants as much as
themselves, i.e., agents are perfectly altruistic. To simplify further the model, I assume
that the child inherits the occupational choice and the asset position of his parent for
one period.
Figure 3.1 describes the timing of the problem.
Figure 3.1: Timing
t
(e, a, ze, ye)
Occupational Choice
Decision: c, a′, k, x
t+1
(e′, a′, z′e, y
′
e)
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His value function is:
V (e, a, ze, ye) = max
m,w
{V m(e, a, ze, ye), V w(e, a, ze, ye)} (3.4)
The entrepreneur’s problem
V e(e, a, ze, ye) = max
c,a′,k,x
{u(c) + βφEV e(e′, a′, z′e, y′e) + β(1− φ)EV (e′, a′, z′e, y′e)}
(3.5)
Subject to:
c+ a′ + x = (1 + r)(k − a) + zekν + (1− δ)k (3.6)
e′ = H(x) (3.7)
a′ ≥ 0 (3.8)
k ≤ (1 + κ)a (3.9)
The expected value of the value function for V e(e′, a′, z′e, y′e) is taken with respect
to (z′e, y′e) conditional on (ze, ye)
EV e(e′, a′, z′e, y′e) =
∑
z′e
∑
e′
∑
y′e
γ(z′e|ze)γ(y′e|ye)h(e′|x)V e(e′, a′, z′e, y′e) (3.10)
The worker’s problem
V w(e, a, ze, ye) = max
c,a′,x
{u(c) + βφEV w(e′, a′, z′e, y′e) + β(1− φ)EV (e′, a′, z′e, y′e)}
(3.11)
Subject to:
c+ a′ + x = (1 + r)a− wye (3.12)
The expected value of the value function for the worker is taken with respect to
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(z′e, y′e) conditional on (ze, ye)
EV w(e′, a′, z′e, y′e) =
∑
z′e
∑
e′
∑
y′e
γ(z′e|ze)γ(y′e|ye)h(e′|x)V w(e′, a′, z′e, y′e) (3.13)
The continuation value for the worker that survives is given by EV (e′, a′, z′e, y′e).
3.3.5 Stationary Equilibrium
Let µ = (e, a, ze, ye) be the state vector for an individual in this economy. From the
decision rules on consumption, savings, and investment in education, and the exogenous
process for income and entrepreneurial ability, the transition function that provides the
probability distribution µ′ next period is given by:
µ′ = T (µ) (3.14)
A stationary equilibrium is a set of value functions and decision rules, and a
constant distribution of people over the state variables (e, a, ze, ye), such that, given
factor prices w and r
• The decision rule solves for household problem described in 3.3.4.
• The capital and labor markets clears.
• The wage and interest rate are given by the marginal products of each factor.
• The µ∗ is the invariant distribution of the economy.
3.4 Calibration
3.4.1 Fixed Parameters
Table (3.3) lists the set of fixed parameters for the model. All households have a period
CRRA utility function with coefficient of relative risk aversion σ = 1.5:
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u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ (3.15)
The survival probability is set to be 1/35 so that agents have 35 years of work-
life. The depreciation rate and labor share of the economy are standard from the
literature. The liquidity constraint parameter determines that at most, an entrepreneur
can leverage the project up to 1.5 times his asset position.
Table 3.3: List of Fixed Parameters
Description Parameter Value Source - Explanation
Risk Aversion σ 1.5 Attanasio et al. [1999]
Survival probability φ 1/35 35 years work-life
Productivity A 1 Normalization
Labor Share α 0.33 Stokey and Rebelo [1995]
Depreciation δ 0.06
Liquidity Constraint κ 0.5 Evans and Jovanovic [1989]
In addition, I adopt a form of educational technology from Rios-Rull and Sanchez-
Marcos [2002] by letting the college attainment in next period as a function of investment
incurred in the last period: H(x) = 1− exp(−x0.9).
Finally, the values and the transition of the income process are taken from Storeslet-
ten et al. [2004] and Terajima [2004]. The possible values for the income process are
ye = {1.0, 3.6, 1.01, 6.45} and the transition matrix Γ(y′|y) = [0.62, 0.39; 0.4, 0.6].
3.5 Findings
Table (3.4) and table (3.5) show the estimated parameters and results of the model,
respectively. The model captures the ratio of wealth between entrepreneurs and workers,
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but it underestimates the levels. The model underestimates the value of being an
entrepreneur for each type. In addition, the model implies a larger business value for
the college group. In the data, it is twice as large for college-graduate entrepreneurs,
while in the model, it generates a factor of 1.5. Given that the model underestimates
the level of the wealth position of entrepreneurs, it also misses the target of the income
share for entrepreneurs.
Table 3.4: Estimated Parameters (8)
Parameter Value
β 0.9
(z1hs, z
2
hs, z
1
c , z
2
c ) (0.3, 1.37, 0.35, 1.5)
Γz(z
′, z) [ 0.940, 0.060
0.250 0.750]
ν 0.72
Table 3.5: Calibration Results
Moments Data (1983) Model
Relative Wealth HS Worker 1.00 1.00
HS Entrepreneur 3.17 2.29
C Worker 2.47 1.92
C Entrepreneur 5.88 3.70
Rel. Business Value HS 1.00 1.00
C 2.08 1.521
Prob(m′|w) HS 0.13 0.11
C 0.132 0.16
Interest Rate 4% 6%
Entrepreneur’s Income Share 0.16 0.10
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3.5.1 Changes in the Wage Structure
Now we feed in changes in the relative wages observed in the data into the model
to generate predictions on entrepreneurship entry. The changes of the wage structure
feature a larger college premium.
With the new wage structure, the model predicts a much lower entrepreneurship
entry for the two groups, especially for the college educated group. Contrary to the
changes observed in the data, the model implies a decrease of 9% and 12% in en-
trepreneurship entry for high-school graduates and college graduates, respectively. This
finding suggests that being an entrepreneur is less valuable, in particular, for the college
group given the recent changes in the college premium.
Table 3.6: Changes in the Wage Structure
Moments Change Data (%) Model Change(%)
Rel. Business Value HS 10.000 5.250
C 62.981 18.796
Prob(m′|w) HS 13.846 -9.091
C 51.515 -12.500
3.5.2 Skill complementarity with Managerial Ability
Now we proceed to reestimate the managerial ability by directly targeting the changes
in the entry behavior. Table (3.7) reports the estimation results. The model captures
the increase in the relative value of the business by each educational group, but it misses
the levels. The implied change is twice as large as the change observed in the data. It
appears that it is difficult to target simultaneously the change in the relative value, and
the observed change in the entry behavior. While the model overestimates the changes
in the value in the business, it misses the target on entry behavior. At most, the model
can generate an increase of 20% in the entry of the college-educated group. Further
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investigation is required to dissect the underlying determinants of the changes in the
behavior.
Table 3.7: Targeting the Change in Entry
Moments Change Data (%) Model Change(%)
Rel. Business Value HS 10.000 8.250
C 62.981 120.000
Prob(m′|w) HS 13.846 -0.150
C 51.515 21.000
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper, I document an increasing gap in the entrepreneurial entry between col-
lege graduates and high school graduates. I build a model of educational choice and
occupational choice to quantitatively assess the role of skill complementarity of man-
agerial ability in explaining this fact. The results of this paper show that the skill
complementarity of managerial ability is crucial in generating the increasing number of
entrepreneurs among college graduates.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Tables and Figures
Data and Sample
Table A.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Real Manufactured Output 1256858.13 9310693.65 1220
Real Manufactured value added 454569.65 3916153.35 1216
Capital Per Worker 6299.14 19085.31 1218
Share of Skilled Workers 0.21 0.14 1247
Total Number of Workers 74.59 158.89 1258
Number of Skilled Workers 13.71 29.28 1247
Number of Unskilled Workers 60.62 136.41 1247
Exp. Share on Foreign Int. Goods 21.78 35.55 1393
Measured in 1991 USD
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Table A.2: Distribution of firms by sector
Distribution of Firms across sectors
Sector name Number of
Firms
Alcohol 60.0
Bakery 288.0
Chemical 204.0
Food (exc drink) 444.0
Furniture 648.0
Garment 660.0
Machines 108.0
Metal 648.0
SSRII 36.0
Textile 120.0
Wood 276.0
Total 3,492.0
Sample size 3,492
Source: Ghana’s manufacturing firm data
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Share of Skilled Labor by Sector
Table A.3: Workforce composition by sectors
Sector name Mean
Share Skill
Labor
Alcohol 0.302
Bakery 0.204
Chemical 0.362
Food (exc drink) 0.308
Furniture 0.161
Garment 0.191
Machines 0.216
Metal 0.241
SSRII 0.198
Textile 0.242
Wood 0.185
Total 0.221
Source: Ghana’s manufacturing firm data
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Table A.4: Average Wages 1992-1998 by Sector
Sector Average Wage by Type of Labor
Unskilled Skilled Relative Wage
Alcohol 462.74 1,349.15 2.92
Bakery 126.74 215.23 1.70
Chemical 434.78 1,265.70 2.91
Food (exc drink) 178.56 555.63 3.11
Furniture 109.28 379.07 3.47
Garment 68.44 198.52 2.90
Machines 115.85 624.71 5.39
Metal 160.77 530.93 3.30
Textile 266.03 876.48 3.29
Wood 202.61 498.35 2.46
Total 212.58 649.38 3.15
Source: Ghana’s manufacturing data (1991 USD).
Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Marriage Dissolution Rate
B.1.1 Female Sample
Table B.1: Fraction of Marriages ending in divorce by their 10 anniversary, age at
marriage older than 25
Year of Marriage Education at Marriage
Non
College
Educated
College
Educated
Difference
1970 0.164 0.100 0.064
1975 0.195 0.152 0.043
1980 0.206 0.149 0.057
1985 0.199 0.153 0.046
1990 0.208 0.142 0.066
Total 0.194 0.139 0.055
Source: SIPP 2001, 2004, 2008 (Weighted)
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B.1.2 Male Sample
Table B.2: Fraction of Marriages ending in divorce by their 10 anniversary, age at
marriage older than 25
Year of Marriage Education at Marriage
Non
College
Educated
College
Educated
Difference
1970 0.186 0.135 0.051
1975 0.203 0.133 0.071
1980 0.209 0.132 0.077
1985 0.218 0.121 0.098
1990 0.224 0.124 0.100
Total 0.208 0.129 0.079
Source: SIPP 2001, 2004, 2008 (Weighted)
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B.2 Regression Tables: Hazard of Divorce
B.2.1 Female Sample
Table B.3: Cox Hazard Regression coefficients (Female Sample)
Empirical Estimation
Coef. S.E
Education at Marriage –.306*** (.025)
Age at Marriage less than 18 .000 (.)
Age at Marriage (18- 19) –.354*** (.022)
Age at Marriage (19-22) –.777*** (.021)
Age at Marriage (22-26) –1.083*** (.028)
Age at Marriage (27-29) –1.376*** (.029)
Age at Marriage (30-34) –1.778*** (.046)
Age at Marriage(34-39) –2.210*** (.082)
Age at Marriage older than 40 –3.077*** (.113)
Presence of a Child –1.190*** (.016)
Source: SIPP 2001-2008
Other covariates include year of marriage and race.
Table B.4: Cox Hazard Regression: implied hazard ratios (Female Sample)
Empirical Estimation
Haz. Ratio Std. Error
Education at Marriage .737*** .018
Presence of a Child .304*** .005
Other covariates: race, age at marriage and year of marriage.
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B.2.2 Male Sample
Table B.5: Cox Hazard Regression coefficients (Male Sample)
Empirical Estimation
Coef. S.E
Education at Marriage –.481*** (.022)
Age at Marriage ¡ 18 .000 (.)
Age at Marriage (18- 19) –.388*** (.036)
Age at Marriage (19-22) –.776*** (.034)
Age at Marriage (22-26) –1.001*** (.034)
Age at Marriage (27-29) –1.178*** (.039)
Age at Marriage (30-34) –1.354*** (.042)
Age at Marriage(34-39) –1.471*** (.057)
Age at Marriage ¿40 –1.944*** (.073)
Source: SIPP 2001-2008
Other covariates include year of marriage and race.
Table B.6: Cox Hazard Regression: implied hazard ratios (Male Sample)
Empirical Estimation
Haz. Ratio p-value Std. Error
Education at Marriage .618 .000 .014
Other covariates: race, age at marriage and year of marriage.
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B.2.3 Divorce hazard over time
Figure B.1: Female Sample
Figure B.2: Male Sample
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B.3 Family disruption and children’s college attainment
B.3.1 Empirical Estimates
Table B.7: Effect of Family Disruption on Children
Coef. Std. Error
Mother college educated .572* .035
Father college educated .711* .032
Family Disruption .410* .024
Race .109* .011
Gender .198* .023
Constant –1.765* .059
No. of cases 19269
* pvalue <0.05
Source: NLSY 1979-1997
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Table B.8: Estimated Parameters, Extended Model
Parameter Estimates
Mixture weight p 0.21
Mixture parameters µ1 0.66
Mixture parameters µ2 0.00
Mixture parameters σ1 4.88
Mixture parameters σ2 9.03
Weight on college completion χ(u∗) 18.15
Weight on college completion χ(e∗) 80.85
